Two Monegasque villas and a private jet were sold in breach of a worldwide Freezing Order against Mr Su’s assets. The Claimant thus brought claims for unlawful means conspiracy and violation of rights in the judgment debt (‘Marex tort’) against the Defendant recipients of the sales proceeds, including Mr. Su’s mother and entities in her control. The Court found her to be untruthful, “up to her neck” in conspiracy, and that the Defendants had combined to evade the Order, rendering enforcement more difficult, thus constituting an unlawful means conspiracy. The ‘Marex tort’ was also satisfied as, knowing of the judgment against Mr Su and the Claimant’s rights, the Defendants had procured, induced and/or facilitated transfer of the sales proceeds.

The Claimant Owners brought High Court proceedings against the Defendant Charterers, pursuant to the C/P exclusive jurisdiction clause, for unpaid hire. The Claimants had earlier arrested the POLA DEVORA, at Gibraltar, as security for their claim, in the mistaken belief that she was owned, rather than chartered by, the Defendants, who now sought to counterclaim tortious damages for wrongful arrest. The Court held that as the arrest was in reliance on the Claimants’ C/P rights, it fell within “any dispute arising out of or in connection with” the C/P conferring jurisdiction on the High Court, and allowing it to dismiss the Claimants’ challenge.

After being condemned to pay some USD130m. for wrongful repudiation of a contract under an arbitral award, the Claimant government, STA, obtained from the Court an extension of the 28-day period for challenge. STA issued another challenge under s.68 after the expiry of the extension and on the same day applied for a retrospective extension of time, relying, inter alia, on the replacement of their Attorney General and their legal representatives. The Court dismissed the application on the bases that i) the delay was significant/substantial (27 days from first extension) with no explanation for it, nor evidence the Defendant/Tribunal contributed to it, ii) lack of prejudice to OFY was not a necessity for refusal, iii) the merits were intrinsically weak, and finally iv) refusal was not unfair, a first extension having already been granted.

BP paid some USD17m for crude oil to be delivered FOB in Egypt under contracts with the Defendants (JV partners in the oil field). Deliveries did not take place and BP sought recovery, principally by way of unjust enrichment. In finding in BP’s favour, the Court dismissed various arguments, including that the contracts were merely for rights to lift which, if not taken up, gave rise to no recovery; also time-bar arising out of BP’s GTCs which provided “any claims arising….shall be commenced within 2 years of…date…oil was delivered or, in the case of total loss, should have been delivered”. The Court ruled that there was neither delivery nor total loss so the time bar was inapplicable and in any event, any ambiguity would be resolved in favour of BP.

“The claimant bank, holder of the b/Is, applied under s.12 of the Arbitration Act to extend the 1 year Hague/Hague Visby Rules time for commencing suit (here arbitration) for misdelivery against the disponent owner carrier, KCH. The bank had started proceedings against the registered owner ignoring the bareboat c/p. The Court in its discretion rejected the application as no requirement of s.12 was satisfied: (i) a simple negligent omission (here the bank's solicitors wrongful identification of the carrier — albeit reinforced by KCH's misleading correspondence) could not be outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties; (ii) KCH's conduct did not amount to heavy fault and did not make it unjust to decline to extend as a considerable portion of the causative burden lay with the bank's solicitors who failed to act skilfully.”

“After the failure of P's claim against Q for damages for breach of a contract of shipment of natural organic juice due to Q's supply of alleged falsified and defective product. P challenged the arbitration which stated that A) 'The facts upon which P relies os to the alleged deliberate dilution of the juice were known to Pin late 2011 or at the latest by March 2012" 6) more than 7 years before P first suggested that the facts amounted to deliberate deceit". P accepted A) but submitted that 8) would cause "substantial injustice" as it would prevent amending its case to plead the tort of deceit. The Court dismissed P's application as no breach of s. 33 of the Act or serious irregularity was proven and the challenge concerned a finding which was "obiter" thus not able to alter the facts or to cause any prejudice to the amendment application.”