After crossing in front of “ Wilforce” ( sailing east), “Western Moscow” turned to port (west) in order to join the westbound channel of the Singaporean Strait Traffic Scheme, and informed “Wilforce” they would “pass port to port”. A collision nevertheless ensued. “Western Moscow’s failure to sound/display appropriate signals, although in breach of COLREGs, was held non-causative. Rather, its poor lookout, “especially striking” when turning westwards where eastbound traffic was expected, caused its failure to “pass port to port”. However, “Wilforce”, in breach of local rules stipulating “maximum manoeuvring readiness”, had failed to reduce speed when collision risk was appreciated. The Court found “Western Moscow” 3 x more to blame and liability was apportioned 75%/25%.

Following a deadly fire caused by dangerous cargo, the Tribunal issued a series of Awards, finding Time Charterers MSC liable to Owners, albeit not finding them negligent. MSC sought to limit liability under MSA 1995 (the Amended 1976 Convention). Owners challenged the right to limit, relying, inter alia, on Art.4 (excluding losses resulting “from [MSC’s] …act or omission, committed… recklessly”), arguing the Tribunal’s finding of no negligence obiter. The Court disagreed, ruling that the finding formed part of the final relief given by the Tribunal. Art.4 was not available to Owners and MSC could limit.

Overturning the decisions of the courts below, the SC held the crossing rule (vessel with the other on her starboard side gives way) was applicable to the Alexandra I while approaching channel/awaiting pilot and sent the matter back to the High Court for collision damage to be re-apportioned. It found that Alexandra I had failed to give way. However, the consequences of the failure were avoidable had it not been for the Ever Smart’s own “gross” fault of having no lookout, despite warning by pilot, and breach of the narrow channel rule. Damage was apportioned 70:30 in favour of Alexandra I.

After MSC Opera ran into River Countess in Venice, Demise Charterers (MSC) accepted responsibility, conceding that Italian law governed recoverability. However, they challenged both title to sue of River Countess’ Charterers and recoverability of their pure economic losses. Relying on Italian law experts, the Court held that Charterers had (in contrast to English law) title to sue in tort and that their net loss of revenue together with ex gratia refunds and payments to passengers were recoverable (subject to proof of causation, unavailability of a substitute vessel and reasonable mitigation of damage to brand/goodwill).

Following an in rem default judgment against “POSEIDON”, the Defendant insurers rejected the Claimant’s demand under the LOU arguing that judgment was only effective against the res and not binding on owners (now in liquidation). The Claimant then obtained an in personam default judgement and the insurers’ application to set it aside (on the basis that no collision statement of claim had been filed) was dismissed by the Court (which found no such requirement in the absence of acknowledgment of service). Further, the argument that the in rem judgment was not binding was irrelevant, the new proceedings being in personam, in which the Registrar’s in rem decision was conclusive evidence. The insurers should have contested the in rem proceedings but any re-litigation of issues was unlikely to reduce the claim below the LOU amount and would put disproportionate costs on the Claimant.

“Further to the destruction of Holyhead Marina by Storm "Emma" in 2018, the claimant lessee in anticipation of claims totalling some f 5M by owners of the damaged craft sought a limitation of its liability to f 550k pursuant to s.191 of the Merchant Shipping Act. The defendant owners (i) denied the claimant's right to limit its liability not being the owner of a "dock" and (ii) alleged that in any event such right would be lost because the loss and damage resulted from a personal act or omission of the claimant committed recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result pursuant to Art.4 of the Limitation Convention. The claimant was successful in striking out item (i) in the Defence, as the Court held that the pontoons forming the Marina may be described as "landing places", "jetties" or "stages" thus falling within the extended statutory definition of "dock". Despite finding it improbable that the requisite "actual knowledge" could be established because this demands a high hurdle, the Court did not strike out (ii) prior to trial as it had "just a real prospect of success".”