“Further to the destruction of Holyhead Marina by Storm "Emma" in 2018, the claimant lessee in anticipation of claims totalling some f 5M by owners of the damaged craft sought a limitation of its liability to f 550k pursuant to s.191 of the Merchant Shipping Act. The defendant owners (i) denied the claimant's right to limit its liability not being the owner of a "dock" and (ii) alleged that in any event such right would be lost because the loss and damage resulted from a personal act or omission of the claimant committed recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result pursuant to Art.4 of the Limitation Convention. The claimant was successful in striking out item (i) in the Defence, as the Court held that the pontoons forming the Marina may be described as "landing places", "jetties" or "stages" thus falling within the extended statutory definition of "dock". Despite finding it improbable that the requisite "actual knowledge" could be established because this demands a high hurdle, the Court did not strike out (ii) prior to trial as it had "just a real prospect of success".”

“The claimant bank, holder of the b/Is, applied under s.12 of the Arbitration Act to extend the 1 year Hague/Hague Visby Rules time for commencing suit (here arbitration) for misdelivery against the disponent owner carrier, KCH. The bank had started proceedings against the registered owner ignoring the bareboat c/p. The Court in its discretion rejected the application as no requirement of s.12 was satisfied: (i) a simple negligent omission (here the bank's solicitors wrongful identification of the carrier — albeit reinforced by KCH's misleading correspondence) could not be outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties; (ii) KCH's conduct did not amount to heavy fault and did not make it unjust to decline to extend as a considerable portion of the causative burden lay with the bank's solicitors who failed to act skilfully.”

“After the failure of P's claim against Q for damages for breach of a contract of shipment of natural organic juice due to Q's supply of alleged falsified and defective product. P challenged the arbitration which stated that A) 'The facts upon which P relies os to the alleged deliberate dilution of the juice were known to Pin late 2011 or at the latest by March 2012" 6) more than 7 years before P first suggested that the facts amounted to deliberate deceit". P accepted A) but submitted that 8) would cause "substantial injustice" as it would prevent amending its case to plead the tort of deceit. The Court dismissed P's application as no breach of s. 33 of the Act or serious irregularity was proven and the challenge concerned a finding which was "obiter" thus not able to alter the facts or to cause any prejudice to the amendment application.”

“After the Spanish Court condemned in 2019 the Master of the "Prestige", her Owners and Club for serious negligence against the environment Spain sought to register in England a Spanish enforcement order. In light of 2014 CA decision binding Spain to the arbitration agreement in the Club's Rules, the Club applied for an order under s.18 of the Arbitration Act appointing an arbitrator to determine a series of applications including a declaration that Spain is in breach of its obligation not to pursue the claims made in the Spanish proceedings other than by way of London arbitration and a declaration that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction, equitable compensation, damages in contract and in lieu of an injunction. The Court held that Spain lacks immunity (other than in respect of the claim for breach of contract) and that an arbitrator is to be appointed pursuant to s.18 in all other Club claims. The Court found that the legal issues raised by Spain about the remedies sought by the Club do not affect the arbitrator's jurisdiction (being germane to the merits) insofar as the Club showed that there was a "good arguable case" that the arbitrator would have the power to make the orders, i.e. that arguments were not obviously wrong such as to make it pointless to appoint one.”

“Subcharterers Gujarat India failed to pay US$ 3.2M freight to Disponent Owners PCL, time charterers of the Vessel Illawarra Fortune. After taking assignment of Owners' rights under the b/Is, PCL tried to recover those sums from Shippers WCL. The bills provided for "freight payable as per Charter Party", i.e. the voyage charter. However, following Wa's failure to pay part of freight costs, the b/Is were marked "Null and Void" and substituted by switch bills identifying New Alloys as shippers. The Court held that because of the novation WCL's liability under the b/Is was extinguished therefore neither Owners nor PCL as their assignee could recover the freight and costs related to the voyage.”

“The Claimant German banks applied for summary judgment to enforce a US$97 M ship finance loan agreement, as amended by later agreements, against the Borrowers, two Liberian companies, and the Guarantor, their Greek beneficial owner. After verifying that the claim was validly served and the Defendants were aware of the proceedings and the application, a hearing took place remotely on 3'6 April but none of the Defendants appeared or was represented. The Claimants' application succeeded against both Borrowers and Guarantor as the Court found that (i) the Defendants had no real prospect of success in defending claims for unchallenged debts "undoubtedly due" and (ii) there was no compelling reason for the claims to be determined at trial. The Court was convinced that a summary judgment might be more readily enforced than a default judgment in other jurisdictions. The Court took the opportunity to end the uncertainty as to enforceability of English judgments in other EU Member states post-Brexit, by ruling that such judgments may be enforced in Greece pursuant to Article 67(2) of the 30.01.20 EU Council Withdrawal Agreement "so long as the proceedings were issued before the end of the transition period".”