The Claimant Owners claimed unpaid T/C hire in High Court proceedings and to secure that claim, arrested a ship, believed to be in Charterers’ ownership, at Gibraltar. The Defendant Charterers sought to set off against hire (i) tortious damages for wrongful arrest; (ii) damages for breach of the C/P delivery/maintenance provisions by reason of hull fouling and (iii) underperformance.

In principle, the Court would have entertained (i) Gibraltar Admiralty law reflecting English law - but found the arrest not wrongful. It disallowed (ii) damages for hull fouling as they would duplicate (iii) the performance claim, which was partially allowed - some good weather underperformance having been made out.

In response to Owners’ demurrage claim under a Shellvoy 6, Charterers contended that in breach, the Vessel had left the discharge berth and refused to return. The Court upheld the Master’s decision finding that at all material times the berth left an unacceptable safety margin under the C/P (Q88) Under Keel Clearance policy, such that Owners could not be satisfied that the Vessel would discharge cargo always ‘safely afloat’ as required. There was no breach by Owners. Although not a necessary finding, the Court commented that almost certainly Charterers would have been in breach had they persisted in their orders.

In response to Owners’ demurrage claim under a Shellvoy 6, Charterers contended that in breach, the Vessel had left the discharge berth and refused to return. The Court upheld the Master’s decision finding that at all material times the berth left an unacceptable safety margin under the C/P (Q88) Under Keel Clearance policy, such that Owners could not be satisfied that the Vessel would discharge cargo always ‘safely afloat’ as required. There was no breach by Owners. Although not a necessary finding, the Court commented that almost certainly Charterers would have been in breach had they persisted in their orders.

Kyla sought damages of some USD32m in connection with pre-2008 FFAs. It sought to rely on s32 of the Limitation Act to postpone the (otherwise) 2013 time bar. The Court ruled that although Kyla’s underlying claim was well founded, a reasonable person should have taken at least a degree of serious interest in why such losses were suffered and thus Kyla could with reasonable diligence have discovered the relevant mistake, disloyalty or concealment within the 6 years. The claim was thus time-barred, and dismissed.

Cash buyers (NKD) of the Shagang Giant purported to terminate the MOA on the grounds that Indian Covid-19 restrictions constituted force majeure preventing both Vessel from reaching outer anchorage (“the Delivery Location”) and Sellers (Bart) from transferring title as per the MOA. The Court disagreed. The force majeure clause was applicable to an inability to transfer title, not an inability to deliver; Sellers had not been precluded from the former, either by inability to reach the anchorage or by government restriction. In any event the Court found the Vessel had arrived at the Delivery Location. Sellers were entitled to the deposit (which exceeded the total losses claimed).

The BARECON stipulated for arbitration (LMAA terms / 3 arbitrators) where a failure to appoint within 14 days entitled the commencing party to appoint their arbitrator as sole arbitrator without notice. The Respondent’s appointee was subsequently unable to participate (compensation below firm’s charge-out rate), and the Claimant argued failure to appoint and entitlement to appoint theirs as sole arbitrator. The Court disagreed; although remuneration was not agreed at the time, there was no conditionality when the Respondent’s appointee accepted the appointment and the Respondent “had unequivocally communicated its appointment” to both the Claimant and their arbitrator.