Vitol sold 30,000 mt fuel oil to JE, FOB Tema with laycan 23-24 December; further terms were envisaged, for example as to the L/C. JE failed to nominate a vessel to arrive Tema within laycan but Vitol continued to demand performance (rather than cancel) until on 1 February, JE declared the contract ‘null and void’ at which point Vitol treated JE as in repudiatory breach. JE argued that in context ‘laycan’ here simply indicated a loading period, which in the event was subsequently extended by agreement to 31 January. The Court found that ‘laycan’ had its traditional meaning and any agreed extension related solely to L/C arrangements. Vitol’s claim for market value (based on its own sales and statistics) of approximately USD3.3m was accepted.

The Claimant claimed fees under an introductory agency agreement. The Defendant alleged that the Claimant had breached financial services legislation - sec. 26(3) of the FSMA - rendering the agency unenforceable. The Claimant applied to strike out the defence and/or for summary judgment. The Court declined as (i) the subject is an area of developing jurisprudence and decisions on novel points of law should be based on actual findings of fact; (ii) given the uncertainty, it was not possible to conclude that the Defendant had no real prospect of success and (iii) a trial would still be needed to investigate the other defences related to the construction of the agency.

The Claimant Owners claimed unpaid T/C hire in High Court proceedings and to secure that claim, arrested a ship, believed to be in Charterers’ ownership, at Gibraltar. The Defendant Charterers sought to set off against hire (i) tortious damages for wrongful arrest; (ii) damages for breach of the C/P delivery/maintenance provisions by reason of hull fouling and (iii) underperformance.

In principle, the Court would have entertained (i) Gibraltar Admiralty law reflecting English law - but found the arrest not wrongful. It disallowed (ii) damages for hull fouling as they would duplicate (iii) the performance claim, which was partially allowed - some good weather underperformance having been made out.

In response to Owners’ demurrage claim under a Shellvoy 6, Charterers contended that in breach, the Vessel had left the discharge berth and refused to return. The Court upheld the Master’s decision finding that at all material times the berth left an unacceptable safety margin under the C/P (Q88) Under Keel Clearance policy, such that Owners could not be satisfied that the Vessel would discharge cargo always ‘safely afloat’ as required. There was no breach by Owners. Although not a necessary finding, the Court commented that almost certainly Charterers would have been in breach had they persisted in their orders.

In response to Owners’ demurrage claim under a Shellvoy 6, Charterers contended that in breach, the Vessel had left the discharge berth and refused to return. The Court upheld the Master’s decision finding that at all material times the berth left an unacceptable safety margin under the C/P (Q88) Under Keel Clearance policy, such that Owners could not be satisfied that the Vessel would discharge cargo always ‘safely afloat’ as required. There was no breach by Owners. Although not a necessary finding, the Court commented that almost certainly Charterers would have been in breach had they persisted in their orders.

Kyla sought damages of some USD32m in connection with pre-2008 FFAs. It sought to rely on s32 of the Limitation Act to postpone the (otherwise) 2013 time bar. The Court ruled that although Kyla’s underlying claim was well founded, a reasonable person should have taken at least a degree of serious interest in why such losses were suffered and thus Kyla could with reasonable diligence have discovered the relevant mistake, disloyalty or concealment within the 6 years. The claim was thus time-barred, and dismissed.