To preserve the Hague-Visby Rules’ 1-year time bar, cargo Buyers obtained a time extension from Shipowners alone before pursuing claims against them – and Disponent Owners – for cargo contamination. Buyers pleaded that both Shipowners and Disponent Owners were estopped from denying that they were parties to the b/l because of the misrepresentation contained in the email granting the extension. The Full Court confirmed the first instance judgment that no claim could be made against Disponent Owners because of the time bar and against Shipowners because they were no party to the contract of carriage. No estoppel could be found because any representation should be clear and unambiguous, the subjective understanding of misrepresentee being irrelevant.

The Claimant Salvors of the Suez Canal-grounded “Ever Given”, sought remuneration from the Defendant Owners pursuant to the Salvage Convention or at common law. The Court decided a preliminary issue as to whether (as Owners argued) remuneration was governed by a concluded binding agreement (based on some ‘main terms’ plus a confirmation). The Owners’ defence failed as it was found that, by their exchanges and conduct objectively assessed, the parties did not purport to conclude a binding contract but merely reached an agreement as to the remuneration terms for a wider contract that was being negotiated.

The University suffered property damage when a previously undiscovered undetonated German bomb (nicknamed 'the Hermann' after Göring) dropped in 1942 was subjected to a controlled detonation. The Claimant Insurers sought a declaration that the damage was "occasioned by war" entitling them to rely on the policy war exclusion clause. In determining the “proximate cause” of the loss, the Court held the common-sense analysis was that it was caused by the explosion necessitated by the reasonable and correct decision to detonate; that decision was necessitated by the original dropping of the bomb which was the “obvious proximate cause of the damage”. The damage was “occasioned by war”.

The Claimant claimed an unpaid amount under a share purchase agreement, against the purchaser (D1, a Cypriot company) and guarantor (D2, a BVI company). The Defendants counterclaimed that they were entitled to set-off the equivalent amount. In ordering that the Defendants secure the Claimants’ costs of defending the counterclaim (by way of a first-Class London bank guarantee), the Court found there was reason to believe (and not just suspect) that D1 would be unable to pay those costs. Nor was it willing to accept that an undertaking by D2 to pay D1’s costs was sufficient: despite contentions that D2 and its subsidiaries had net assets over USD67m and cash over USD10m, the evidence was unconvincing and D2 was a BVI corporation, not obliged to file audited accounts.

In a dispute between those interested in a Liberian one-ship company, the Claimant Iranian national (resident in Qatar) claimed that the 1st Defendant Iranian national (resident in England and Greece) had failed to honour a Trust and had ‘stolen’ and sold the subject Vessel, whereas the latter claimed that the shares (and Vessel) were his outright (having been exchanged for Persian carpets worth some USD9m). The present judgment involved D1’s application for security for costs, which the Court granted, as it met the CPR gateway tests and the “factual complication” (including allegations of fraud, forgeries and misconduct) made it impossible for the Court to investigate the merits and form a view on the likely success or otherwise of the claim by the time it reached trial.

Under a T/C on an amended Asbatime 1981 form, Charterers warranted that their orders would respect the C/P maximum duration, failing which Owners (Clause 119) had the option to refuse an offending order, or to perform it “without prejudice to their right to claim damages, including consequential damages….in case of late redelivery”. Following an admitted late delivery, Charterers argued that damages should be limited to the difference between market and C/P rate for the extended period. However, the Tribunal also awarded Owners the losses they claimed thereafter, arising out of cancellation of the follow-on fixture repositioning the Vessel for a planned dry-docking. The Tribunal found that Clause 119 was an exception to the ordinary measure of damages and that here Charterers were aware at the time of fixing of the importance of timely redelivery due to dry-dock commitments and the commercial likelihood of a repositioning fixture.