The Supreme Court held that the time bar in Article III Rule 6 of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules applies to claims for misdelivery after discharge and other breaches occurring post-discharge but before delivery. Rejecting arguments limiting the time bar to the “period of responsibility” (loading to discharge), Lord Hamblen confirmed its broader scope, including pre-loading breaches linked to specific goods. This decision resolves a longstanding legal dispute, clarifying the Rules’ application to breaches beyond the traditional “period of responsibility”.

In a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the BVI Claimant (noted by the Court to be financially challenged) was ordered to provide security for the Defendant’s costs at various stages, 12 days before trial, cleared funds for the last two tranches (totalling almost GBP 1.3m) had still not been paid into Court, nor the trial fee. The High Court allowed a further 6 days for the Claimant to comply, before striking out the claim. The Claimant appealed, citing authority that their uncleared cheque paid into Court within the deadline sufficed. The CA distinguished that case and upheld the High Court ruling of strike out.

In a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the BVI Claimant (noted by the Court to be financially challenged) was ordered to provide security for the Defendant’s costs at various stages, 12 days before trial, cleared funds for the last two tranches (totalling almost GBP 1.3m) had still not been paid into Court, nor the trial fee. The High Court allowed a further 6 days for the Claimant to comply, before striking out the claim. The Claimant appealed, citing authority that their uncleared cheque paid into Court within the deadline sufficed. The CA distinguished that case and upheld the High Court ruling of strike out.

Under MOAs for the sale of tankers, Buyers failed to place 10% deposits in escrow as required; Sellers terminated the MOAs. Buyers contended that Sellers’ claims were restricted to prove damages (rather than the fixed deposits), relying on a long-standing principle that a condition precedent (here lodging deposits), if unfulfilled, is dispensed with in calculating damages. Allowing Sellers’ appeal, the CA ruled that the principle was one of construction not law and was unavailable to a party failing, in breach, to fulfill the condition precedent. Buyers could not benefit from their own wrong by thwarting the accrual of the deposits.

Under specific C/P provisions, Charterers, Vitol succeeded against owners, Rhine, in respect of a 6-day delay in reaching a load port, requiring Vitol to pay a higher price to its seller (derived from Platts on the eventual, rather than expected B/L date). Before the C.A., Rhine re-cast its argument that Vitol’s internal hedging should have been taken into account. The C.A. disallowed the new basis and confirmed that Vitol’s internal hedging was unrelated and did not serve to reduce the damages payable by Rhine.

The CA dismissed the defendant Owners’ challenge to the Admiralty Court’s ruling that the claimant Salvors were entitled to remuneration pursuant to the Salvage Convention or common law (i.e. limited only by Vessel salved value). Upholding the findings of the Court below, the CA agreed that Owners had failed to discharge their burden of demonstrating, by way of the exchanges with Salvors, an unequivocal intention to enter a binding, fixed remuneration agreement instead. Nor could it be said, in the circumstances, that when urgent negotiations subsided, this evidenced that both parties considered a binding agreement concluded.