“In upholding the decision of the Admiralty Court, the Court of Appeal found that the passage plan is an "attribute" of a vessel which, if defective, can render it unseaworthy. It did so in the present case, defeating the owners' general average contribution claim. The judgment suggests that navigational oversights prior to or at the commencement of a voyage can lead to owners incurring liabilities if such errors eventually cause loss.”

“As part of a complex corporate transaction, the Claimant was to provide an Assignment to the Bank, by way of security. It emerged some years later that it had omitted to do so therefore it issued 2 deeds in favour of the Bank with the effect of replacing the missing security but also imposing additional, onerous obligations on the Claimant. The High Court found that the additional obligations were the result of a common mistake (both subjectively and objectively) and ordered rectification of the deeds. The Bank appealed arguing that the sole test was an objective one, and moreover one going to the legal rather than mere commercial effect of the agreement. The CA disagreed, ruling that a subjective common mistake as to legal consequences was sufficient — and established — although the objective test was also met. Relevant factors in both were that this was not a new agreement, the commercial absurdity of gratuitously taking on additional obligations and the absence of discussion about such a radical modification to the previous arrangements.”

“In concluding that the Classification clause (9) in a BARECON '89 Charterparty is a condition, the CA (overruling the High Court) found that it is instead an innominate term, for the following reasons of construction and business common sense: it relates merely to classification status; it is not expressed to be a condition nor is it a time clause or a condition precedent leading to significant consequences; further, it was closely bound up with the general obligation to maintain physical condition of the vessel and a trivial breach might well result in disproportionate consequences destructive of a long-term contractual relationship.”

“In respect of its claim for damages for breach of contract, W issued a claim form on 19 June 2017, the day before expiry of the 6 year limitation period, and sent it, just before its validity expired, 4 months later, to P's solicitors, who had no authority to accept service. Accordingly, service was ineffective, the time bar had passed and the claim form expired. The Court of Appeal declined to allow "retrospective validation of service", the required "good reason" not having been established: Neither P nor its solicitors had a duty to advise of their lack of authorisation, they were not playing "technical games" and conversely W had "courted disaster" by leaving issue and service to the last moment.”

“In the context of the avian flu epidemic of 2015 R, a US supplier of egg products, contracted with N to fulfil, over two years, R's supply commitments. In light of an agreed but suspicious increase in the sale price and alleged failure to meet required US standards, R suspended performance, causing N to claim loss of profit damages. The first instance judge dismissed the quality issue but granted R rescission on the grounds of N's fraudulent misrepresentation as to prices. The CA dismissed N's appeal based on the test of inducement, drawing a distinction between fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentation: the test in the former is less rigorous, as there is no requirement for the representee to show that he would not have entered into the contract but for the representation, it being sufficient that the fraud was "actively present to his mind".”

“The Court upheld the first instance decision that article IV r2(b) exempts the carrier from liability if the fire was caused deliberately or barratrously (meaning without the actual fault or privity of the carrier). The appellants tried in vain to infer that barratry would be incompatible with fault or neglect of the crew (here the chief engineer) but the Court found no basis for justifying such conclusion.”