“A Prolonged Port Stays clause in a charter on an amended NYPE 1993 form provided for charterers to be responsible for excessive marine growth if established at the long-stay port. The Tribunal held that the clause was to be construed widely so as to encompass cases where hull inspection at the long-stay port was not possible, alternatively a provision would be implied to that effect. Further "excessive marine growth" meant any growth which had a measurable impact on the performance of the vessel. In the present case, the Tribunal held that the impact was measurable as performance improved after hull cleaning.”

“In concluding that the Classification clause (9) in a BARECON '89 Charterparty is a condition, the CA (overruling the High Court) found that it is instead an innominate term, for the following reasons of construction and business common sense: it relates merely to classification status; it is not expressed to be a condition nor is it a time clause or a condition precedent leading to significant consequences; further, it was closely bound up with the general obligation to maintain physical condition of the vessel and a trivial breach might well result in disproportionate consequences destructive of a long-term contractual relationship.”

“The High Court decided a Defendant's application that the Liberian corporate Claimant secure its costs in a dispute relating to return of aircraft lease deposits. There was no information whatsoever on the Claimant's financial position (either publicly available or volunteered) and the Defendant had therefore satisfied the test of showing reason to believe that the Claimant would be unable to meet a costs award. However, as the claim and cross-claim were essentially two sides of the same coin (such that the costs incurred in defending the claim would be the same as those incurred in prosecuting the cross-claim) the Court considered it not just to make the order requested.”

“The Supreme Court confirmed that costs incurred both before and after notice of abandonment may be taken into account in ascertaining whether a vessel is a CTL pursuant to s.60(2)(ii) of the Marine Insurance Act 1996; SCOPIC charges however are not to be taken into account as, by contrast, they are 'unconnected with the damage to the hull or its hypothetical reinstatement.'“

“The Claimants purchased bunker from OW to supply two vessels in 2014. In respect of each supply, a Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over disputes by reason of a London arbitration clause in OW's 2013 terms and pursuant to that, held t OW's claim for payment to have been validly assigned to ING Bank. The Claimants sought a re-hearing under s67 of the Arbitration Act. The Court declined to find that the (recently introduced) arbitration clause had not been brought to the Claimants' attention; that there was a course of dealing between the parties excluding the 2013 terms or that they were varied by correspondence. Nor did the Court's s.27 jurisdiction extend to re-hearing the assignment issue.”

“In respect of its claim for damages for breach of contract, W issued a claim form on 19 June 2017, the day before expiry of the 6 year limitation period, and sent it, just before its validity expired, 4 months later, to P's solicitors, who had no authority to accept service. Accordingly, service was ineffective, the time bar had passed and the claim form expired. The Court of Appeal declined to allow "retrospective validation of service", the required "good reason" not having been established: Neither P nor its solicitors had a duty to advise of their lack of authorisation, they were not playing "technical games" and conversely W had "courted disaster" by leaving issue and service to the last moment.”