Following an in rem default judgment against “POSEIDON”, the Defendant insurers rejected the Claimant’s demand under the LOU arguing that judgment was only effective against the res and not binding on owners (now in liquidation). The Claimant then obtained an in personam default judgement and the insurers’ application to set it aside (on the basis that no collision statement of claim had been filed) was dismissed by the Court (which found no such requirement in the absence of acknowledgment of service). Further, the argument that the in rem judgment was not binding was irrelevant, the new proceedings being in personam, in which the Registrar’s in rem decision was conclusive evidence. The insurers should have contested the in rem proceedings but any re-litigation of issues was unlikely to reduce the claim below the LOU amount and would put disproportionate costs on the Claimant.

The CA ruled that a fuel oil sale Recap term making the quality inspection certificate binding on both parties, could not “fairly and sensibly be read together” with an incorporated BP term making the certificate binding “for invoicing purposes”. Buyers were therefore precluded from pursuing their quality claim on the following grounds: i) the BP term effectively deprived the Recap term of all effect, ii) a regime in which a quality certificate is binding is significantly different from one in which it is not, iii) it was unlikely the parties would wish to detract from this central feature of quality determination, and iv) while possible to agree a non-binding analysis, on a commercially reasonable interpretation this was not what the parties had agreed.

Owners’ demurrage claim was based on time running from the first NOR, which was tendered at Southwest Pass when congestion prevented berthing at UBT Davant. The C/P Recap provided that a valid NOR could be given “at or off the port…WWWW” (whether or not at berth, in port, customs cleared or free pratique). However, the Recap also incorporated the UBT (United Bulk Terminal) rules. Charterers relied on the latter, which set out preconditions for a valid NOR including that vessel was at “berth or closest available anchorage”. The Tribunal held that the conflicting terms in the incorporated document (UBT rules) gave way to those in the primary agreement (Recap) and that the Southwest Pass was the nearest anchorage for waiting and vessel was “off the port”. Consequently, the first NOR was valid and Owners’ demurrage claim successful.

Voyage Charterers requested the vessel to wait off the discharge port for some 6 days (after NOR tendered). Owners claimed damages for detention and bunker cost – not demurrage – arguing that the request took matters outside the scope of the C/P. The Tribunal held that the request was not “manifestly outside” the contract, laytime ran and Charterers were entitled to all of it. As neither party had put forward a demurrage basis the (SCP) Tribunal made its own assessment.

BP paid some USD17m for crude oil to be delivered FOB in Egypt under contracts with the Defendants (JV partners in the oil field). Deliveries did not take place and BP sought recovery, principally by way of unjust enrichment. In finding in BP’s favour, the Court dismissed various arguments, including that the contracts were merely for rights to lift which, if not taken up, gave rise to no recovery; also time-bar arising out of BP’s GTCs which provided “any claims arising….shall be commenced within 2 years of…date…oil was delivered or, in the case of total loss, should have been delivered”. The Court ruled that there was neither delivery nor total loss so the time bar was inapplicable and in any event, any ambiguity would be resolved in favour of BP.

“Further to the destruction of Holyhead Marina by Storm "Emma" in 2018, the claimant lessee in anticipation of claims totalling some f 5M by owners of the damaged craft sought a limitation of its liability to f 550k pursuant to s.191 of the Merchant Shipping Act. The defendant owners (i) denied the claimant's right to limit its liability not being the owner of a "dock" and (ii) alleged that in any event such right would be lost because the loss and damage resulted from a personal act or omission of the claimant committed recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result pursuant to Art.4 of the Limitation Convention. The claimant was successful in striking out item (i) in the Defence, as the Court held that the pontoons forming the Marina may be described as "landing places", "jetties" or "stages" thus falling within the extended statutory definition of "dock". Despite finding it improbable that the requisite "actual knowledge" could be established because this demands a high hurdle, the Court did not strike out (ii) prior to trial as it had "just a real prospect of success".”