Kyla sought damages of some USD32m in connection with pre-2008 FFAs. It sought to rely on s32 of the Limitation Act to postpone the (otherwise) 2013 time bar. The Court ruled that although Kyla’s underlying claim was well founded, a reasonable person should have taken at least a degree of serious interest in why such losses were suffered and thus Kyla could with reasonable diligence have discovered the relevant mistake, disloyalty or concealment within the 6 years. The claim was thus time-barred, and dismissed.

Owners settled cargo interests’ claim (heat damaged soybeans) and sought 100% contribution from Time Charterers pursuant to cl.8 of the ICA (incorporated into the C/P) on the basis that there was “clear and irrefutable evidence” that the cargo was loaded with excessive moisture content, thus of Charterers’ neglect. The Tribunal, whilst finding the settlement reasonable (cl.4 ICA), nevertheless awarded Owners just 50%, there being no “clear and irrefutable evidence” of Charterers’ neglect, indeed rain wetting due to Owners’ failure promptly to close hatch covers was equally possible, if not likely.

Cash buyers (NKD) of the Shagang Giant purported to terminate the MOA on the grounds that Indian Covid-19 restrictions constituted force majeure preventing both Vessel from reaching outer anchorage (“the Delivery Location”) and Sellers (Bart) from transferring title as per the MOA. The Court disagreed. The force majeure clause was applicable to an inability to transfer title, not an inability to deliver; Sellers had not been precluded from the former, either by inability to reach the anchorage or by government restriction. In any event the Court found the Vessel had arrived at the Delivery Location. Sellers were entitled to the deposit (which exceeded the total losses claimed).

The High Court had found the Britannia LOU, despite its inclusion of a sanctions clause potentially suspending payment, to be in a form “reasonably satisfactory to the other” as required by the agreed ASG 2 form; nevertheless it found the Respondent under no obligation to accept it. The CA disagreed. On proper construction the ASG2 was to operate instead of an arrest and there was no right of arrest once security in in satisfactory form had been provided. An opposite finding, which would have allowed a beneficiary to seek better or alternative security elsewhere, was held contrary to Admiralty practice and the “clear purpose and…language of ASG 2”. The appeal was allowed.

The High Court had found the Britannia LOU, despite its inclusion of a sanctions clause potentially suspending payment, to be in a form “reasonably satisfactory to the other” as required by the agreed ASG 2 form; nevertheless it found the Respondent under no obligation to accept it. The CA disagreed. On proper construction the ASG2 was to operate instead of an arrest and there was no right of arrest once security in in satisfactory form had been provided. An opposite finding, which would have allowed a beneficiary to seek better or alternative security elsewhere, was held contrary to Admiralty practice and the “clear purpose and…language of ASG 2”. The appeal was allowed.

The BARECON stipulated for arbitration (LMAA terms / 3 arbitrators) where a failure to appoint within 14 days entitled the commencing party to appoint their arbitrator as sole arbitrator without notice. The Respondent’s appointee was subsequently unable to participate (compensation below firm’s charge-out rate), and the Claimant argued failure to appoint and entitlement to appoint theirs as sole arbitrator. The Court disagreed; although remuneration was not agreed at the time, there was no conditionality when the Respondent’s appointee accepted the appointment and the Respondent “had unequivocally communicated its appointment” to both the Claimant and their arbitrator.