“By a 5-year 2013 contract, Seadrill agreed to provide drilling services to Tullow by a semi-submersible tug, in specified sea areas off Ghana. In2014, an UNCLOS tribunal ordered Ghana to stop drilling with the effect that from late 2016 Tullow would not be able to exploit the relevant areas. Tullow ceased to pay hire and terminated the contract relying on a term excusing performance if fulfilment of the contract was delayed or prevented by defined 'force majeure' events. The Court found that although there was a force majeure event as defined (drilling moratorium) it had to be the sole cause of the party's failure to perform. Here however there were two concurrent causes preventing performance and the other (government failure to approve a wider plan), was held to be the effective one.”

“Owners challenged an arbitration award which held them liable to charterers in damages representing loss of value of the cargo following unauthorised fumigation. After the damage, receivers had assigned rights to charterers. If, as appeared, that assignment had been the basis of the tribunal's ruling, they had erred in law in not first making any finding that the receivers had sustained loss (an assignee not being able to acquire rights greater than those of the assignor); if charterers in their own right had suffered the loss (as alternatively argued), this too was not apparent from the award, which the Court ordered should be remitted to the tribunal for further consideration.”

“The Tribunal found that Sellers had exceeded the contractually specified period of delay, such that Buyers were entitled to terminate a shipbuilding contract and recover the instalments advanced; The Tribunal rejected Sellers' contentions for an implied term as to mutual co-operation and non-impeding, or the application of the 'Prevention Principle' on the grounds that the sophisticated express terms left no room for such provisions.”

“In an important case relating to the Hague Rules, the High Court ruled that (i) the Art III rule 6 one year time bar applies to claims for wrongful delivery (as well as claims for failures in the carriage of the cargo); and (ii) that such time bar is not interrupted by proceedings brought in a jurisdiction other than that stipulated, even if the Claimant did not have actual knowledge of the jurisdiction provision.”

“A long chain included 'middle' voyage charters (P/Q, Q/R, R/S) each with a clause imposing a time bar unless claims were notified and an arbitrator appointed within 13 months of final discharge. A cargo damage claim was brought against head owners after 11 months. Notice of an indemnity claim reached 'P' on the last day of the 13 month period remained unseen until the following day, so that notice to 'Q' and so on down the line was delayed. The Court construed the clause literally and strictly, rather than in the light of the chain. It also declined to extend P's time under s.12 of the Arbitration Act because although the circumstances were outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties, P did not act expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion viz a viz Q.”

“Time charterers Grindrod had delayed for more than 6 years in pursuing their London arbitration claim for damages against owners and in the meantime the contractual time bar passed. The Tribunal issued an award, dismissing the claim on the grounds of an inordinate and inexcusable delay. The High Court dismissed Grindrod's 'serious irregularity' challenge to the award, pursuant to S.68 of the Arbitration Act , on the grounds that the complaint was one of form rather than substance (submissions raised and responded to under one heading had been addressed under another) and therefore there had been no breach of duty by the Tribunal nor any substantial injustice.”