“In an important case relating to the Hague Rules, the High Court ruled that (i) the Art III rule 6 one year time bar applies to claims for wrongful delivery (as well as claims for failures in the carriage of the cargo); and (ii) that such time bar is not interrupted by proceedings brought in a jurisdiction other than that stipulated, even if the Claimant did not have actual knowledge of the jurisdiction provision.”

“A long chain included 'middle' voyage charters (P/Q, Q/R, R/S) each with a clause imposing a time bar unless claims were notified and an arbitrator appointed within 13 months of final discharge. A cargo damage claim was brought against head owners after 11 months. Notice of an indemnity claim reached 'P' on the last day of the 13 month period remained unseen until the following day, so that notice to 'Q' and so on down the line was delayed. The Court construed the clause literally and strictly, rather than in the light of the chain. It also declined to extend P's time under s.12 of the Arbitration Act because although the circumstances were outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties, P did not act expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion viz a viz Q.”

“Time charterers Grindrod had delayed for more than 6 years in pursuing their London arbitration claim for damages against owners and in the meantime the contractual time bar passed. The Tribunal issued an award, dismissing the claim on the grounds of an inordinate and inexcusable delay. The High Court dismissed Grindrod's 'serious irregularity' challenge to the award, pursuant to S.68 of the Arbitration Act , on the grounds that the complaint was one of form rather than substance (submissions raised and responded to under one heading had been addressed under another) and therefore there had been no breach of duty by the Tribunal nor any substantial injustice.”

“The Supreme Court held that the No Oral Modification (NOM) provision in a contract for occupation of office premises deprived a subsequent alleged oral agreement of any binding force as a contract variation. Parties who orally agree to the terms of a variation of the substance of their contractual relationship do not thereby impliedly agree to dispense with the NOM clause.”

“Following salvage assistance to a Vessel suffering engine shut-downs near navigation channels, the LOF arbitrator based his award on a danger posed by temporary immobilisation but declined to find a collision risk danger. The appeal arbitrator accepted such a danger, increasing the salvor's remuneration. Owners raised a 'serious irregularity' challenge, saying that this particular danger (collision offshore instead of on channel passage) was neither pleaded nor argued but merely raised in discussion by the appeal arbitrator. The Court dismissed the challenge, refusing to find unfairness (Owners had the opportunity to address the point) or that any irregularity was 'serious' (given that salvage arbitration is informal in nature and the arbitrators are expected to use their own knowledge and experience) or that there had been substantial injustice (as a significantly different outcome was unlikely to have resulted from Owners addressing the new point).”

“The Court allowed an appeal from an arbitration award which had held that shipowners were unable to recover from charterers in respect of liability to those interested in a cargo of direct reduced iron. Clause 49 of the c/p on the NYPE 46 form stated "the Stevedores... to remain under the direction of the Master who will be responsible for proper stowage and seaworthiness and safety of the vessel". The Court held that such a partial transfer of responsibility to the shipowners for some aspects of cargo handling is not sufficient for there to be considered a "similar amendment" for the purposes of Clause 8(b) of the ICA.”