London jurisdiction having been agreed by the two owners following a collision in India, liability was admitted and quantum settled by an accepted pre-action ‘Part 36’ offer, appending a more detailed Settlement Agreement. In addition to its London lawyers’ and Club costs (comprised in the ‘Part 36’), the Claimant (in costs proceedings) sought additional fees of Indian agents, lawyers and P&I Correspondents and those of its H&M insurers’ Italian lawyers. The Court found that whilst these items might have been open for recovery under the ‘Part 36’ terms, they were in fact covered by the more detailed Settlement Agreement, which superseded the ‘Part 36’ terms.

A Shipbuilding contract guarantee in respect of the (USD170m) final instalment for a USD200m drillship, given “absolutely and unconditionally” and “not merely as…surety” provided for payment “upon receipt…of…first written demand….” by the Builder. But in the event of a dispute over Buyer’s liability to pay, submitted to arbitration, the Guarantor was entitled to withhold payment pending the award. The CA, overturning the High Court judgment, ruled that this was a ‘demand’ guarantee (without reference to Buyer’s underlying liability) not merely a ‘see to it’ one and that the proviso operated only where the underlying liability arbitration had been commenced prior to the guarantee demand.

Two Monegasque villas and a private jet were sold in breach of a worldwide Freezing Order against Mr Su’s assets. The Claimant thus brought claims for unlawful means conspiracy and violation of rights in the judgment debt (‘Marex tort’) against the Defendant recipients of the sales proceeds, including Mr. Su’s mother and entities in her control. The Court found her to be untruthful, “up to her neck” in conspiracy, and that the Defendants had combined to evade the Order, rendering enforcement more difficult, thus constituting an unlawful means conspiracy. The ‘Marex tort’ was also satisfied as, knowing of the judgment against Mr Su and the Claimant’s rights, the Defendants had procured, induced and/or facilitated transfer of the sales proceeds.

The Respondent Charterers, a trading arm of the Government of Mauritius, repudiated a 15-year COA. The arbitrator dismissed Charterer’s argument that the COA was unlawful, due to lack of required approval by the Central Procurement Board, and awarded some USD115m. to the Appellant owner. The Supreme Court of Mauritius (SCM) held that the COA, being unapproved, was in contravention of public procurement legislation, and set the award aside as it conflicted with public policy. The Privy Council, on appeal, held that, whilst the SCM was empowered to determine whether an award conflicted with public policy, this power did not permit it to review the legality of the COA, which turned on statutory interpretation, and gave rise to no issues of public policy. The appeal was allowed, and the award final and enforceable.

The Claimant Owners brought High Court proceedings against the Defendant Charterers, pursuant to the C/P exclusive jurisdiction clause, for unpaid hire. The Claimants had earlier arrested the POLA DEVORA, at Gibraltar, as security for their claim, in the mistaken belief that she was owned, rather than chartered by, the Defendants, who now sought to counterclaim tortious damages for wrongful arrest. The Court held that as the arrest was in reliance on the Claimants’ C/P rights, it fell within “any dispute arising out of or in connection with” the C/P conferring jurisdiction on the High Court, and allowing it to dismiss the Claimants’ challenge.

After being condemned to pay some USD130m. for wrongful repudiation of a contract under an arbitral award, the Claimant government, STA, obtained from the Court an extension of the 28-day period for challenge. STA issued another challenge under s.68 after the expiry of the extension and on the same day applied for a retrospective extension of time, relying, inter alia, on the replacement of their Attorney General and their legal representatives. The Court dismissed the application on the bases that i) the delay was significant/substantial (27 days from first extension) with no explanation for it, nor evidence the Defendant/Tribunal contributed to it, ii) lack of prejudice to OFY was not a necessity for refusal, iii) the merits were intrinsically weak, and finally iv) refusal was not unfair, a first extension having already been granted.